

**Department of Economics
2025-2026
Seminar Series**



Monday, September 15, 2025
12:30 PM - 1:50 PM
SBS, Room N603

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Selling Timing Information

Abstract: This paper finds a revenue-maximizing mechanism for selling information about a dynamic state to a buyer deciding when to take an action. The state is binary, transitioning from a “bad” to an absorbing “good” state at an exponentially distributed random time. The state process is costlessly observable to the seller but not to the buyer. The seller can commit to a mechanism but cannot use punishing transfers to dictate the buyer's post-contractual behavior. The buyer has a privately known time-invariant fixed cost of action. The characterized revenue-maximizing mechanism generates a menu including full information and information with delay or error.

All in-person seminars will be held in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Building, Room N603. For additional information, contact the seminar organizers: Profs. Jonathan Becker and Lorenz Ekerdt. Visit our webpage for additional information: stonybrook.edu/economics.

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