ALEJANDRO MELO PONCE

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STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY

Office Contact Information

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Personal Information

Citizenship: Mexican. Languages: English (Fluent), Spanish (Native)

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Stony Brook University, USA, 2013-2019 (expected).

B.A. in Economics (Economic Theory an Mathematical Economics fields), ITAM, Mexico, 2005-2010.

Research Fields

Information Economics and Mechanism Design, Pure and Applied Game Theory, Mathematical Economics.

Working Papers

- "The Secret Behind *The Tortoise and the Hare*: Information Design in Contests", 2018 (**Job Market Paper**).

Work In Progress

- "Information Design and the Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values", 2018.
- "Robustness of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Tullock Contests", 2018.
- "Preferences for Status in Large Anonymous Games", 2016.
- "*Type Categorization* in Incomplete Information Games". 2015.
- "Sudan Conflict: Network approach", joint with M. Fernandes and C. Rubbini, 2015.

Teaching Experience

- Instructor at Stony Brook University (2013–2019)
  - Econometrics (Undergraduate: summer 2016, spring 2017, spring 2018.)
  - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Undergraduate: fall 2016, spring 2019—*scheduled*.)
  - Money and Banking (Undergraduate: fall 2015.)
  - Introduction to Economics (Undergraduate: summer 2015.)
  - Thinking Strategically (Undergraduate: *online course*, summer 2017, summer 2018.)
  - Demographic Economics of Developing Countries (Undergraduate: *online course*, winter 2018.)
- Teaching Assistant at Stony Brook University (2013–2019)
  - Microeconomics II (Graduate: spring 2016)
  - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Undergraduate: summer 2014, fall 2014, spring 2015)

  - Introduction to Economics (Undergraduate: fall 2013, spring 2014, fall 2017—*Head TA for 500 student class*.)
  - Econometrics (Undergraduate: fall 2018.)

Conferences and Presentations

- 2018: Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting (scheduled), Econometric Society Australasian Meeting, 29th Stony Brook Internacional Conference on Game Theory, Midwest Economics Association Annual Meeting.
- 2017: Summer School of the Econometric Society: Advances in Economic Theory, 28th Stony Brook Internacional Conference on Game Theory.

Fellowships, Scholarships, and Awards

- Distinguished Travel Award, Graduate Student Organization, Stony Brook University, 2018.
- Departamental Travel Support, Department of Economics, Stony Brook University, 2017,2018.
- Summer School of the Econometric Society Travel support, Econometric Society, 2017.
- GSEU Professional Development Program Award, Graduate Student Employees Union, 2017.
- Summer Online Teaching Initiative Scholarship *(development of Thinking Strategically as an online course)*, Office of the Provost, Stony Brook University, 2017.
- Tuition Scholarship and Graduate Assistanship, Department of Economics, Stony Brook University, 2013–2019.
- Scholarship for Undergraduate Studies, ITAM, 2005–2008.

Past Employment

- Research Assistant for Prof. Miguel Angel Iraola Guzman, Center for Economic Research, ITAM (2011-2013).
- Research Assistant for Prof. Sandra Lizarazo, Center for Economic Research, ITAM (2010).

Professional Service

- Session Chair (Session Micro Theory 2): 2018 Econometric Society Australasian Meeting.
- Discussant (Session 2A, Game Theory and Contests): 2018 MEA Annual Meeting.
- Local Organizer: 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University.
- President (2017–2018): Economics Research Group *(Graduate student club)*, Department of Economics, Stony Brook University.
- Senator (2016): Graduate Student Organization, Department of Economics, Stony Brook University.

Professional Memberships

Econometric Society, American Economic Association, European Economic Association, Midwest Economics Association, Southern Economic Association.

Others

- Programming Languages: TEXand LATEX, Mathematica, MATLAB, Dynare, R, Java, Python, Fortran.
- Miscellaneous: GNU/Linux, Eviews, Stata, Maple, MS Office.

References

Prof. Pradeep Dubey (Advisor)
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Center for Game Theory, Stony Brook
& Visiting Professor
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& Dean of the Adelson School of Entrepreneurship
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***The Secret Behind the Tortoise and the Hare*: Information Design in Contests**

(Job Market Paper)

I analyze the optimal information disclosure problem under commitment of a “contest designer” in a class of binary action contests with incomplete information about the abilities of the players. The class of contests analyzed here is parameterized by the value of a common prize, the cost of exerting effort, the private first-order beliefs that the players hold about their rival’s ability and the value to the designer of the action profile of the players. If the contest designer wants to incentivize the players to play in equilibrium a particular strategy profile, he can design an information disclosure rule, formally a stochastic communication mechanism, to which he will commit and then use to “talk" with the players. The main tool to carry out the analysis is the concept of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium recently introduced in the literature. I characterize the optimal information disclosure rule in the class of contests considered. I find that the optimal information disclosure rules involves private information revelation (manipulation). Furthermore, the optimal disclosure rule involves asymmetric and in most cases correlated signals that convey only partial information about the abilities of the players. In particular, when two players differ in their abilities, it is of crucial importance to reveal information asymmetrically. The revelation scheme alters not only the first-order beliefs of the players but also the higher-order hierarchies in a non-trivial way. Precisely for the previous two reasons, public revelation of information is not optimal, since it generates symmetric hierarchies of beliefs even when the players are different in their abilities. Finally, we perform a comparative statics exercise in which we also allow the designer to alter the value of the prize that the contestants are competing for while at the same time engaging in information design. I find necessary and sufficient conditions on the parameters of the game to ensure that a private, asymmetric and partial information revelation scheme is optimal for the designer and I also provide conditions for when is the case that giving no information is optimal.